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EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY: THE LETHAL ABSENCE OF HOPE1
Jonathan Harris* and Lothlórien Redmond**
Executive clemency is an act by a governmental chief
executive that relieves in whole, or in part, the consequences
resulting from a criminal conviction.2 Although not limited to
death penalty cases, the concept of clemency is most commonly associated with the decision by a sitting state governor
whether to commute a sentence of death to a lesser sentence,
usually to life imprisonment.3 It is in that context that this article examines the meaning and process of clemency.
Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English
Language, first published in 1775, defined clemency as “mercy,
humanity, tenderness” and pardon as “to excuse, to forgive, to
remit.”4 At the time Dr. Johnson published his dictionary, the
pardon power was already well-established in England as a discretionary power of the crown. The pardon or clemency power,
exercised today by the President and the governors of the fifty
states, is a direct descendent of that power of the English king.5
We begin, however, with an interpretation of clemency that strays far from Dr. Johnson’s definition of “mercy,
humanity, tenderness” and that has gained predominance in this
country since the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Gregg v.
Georgia6 restored the death penalty. Under this interpretation,
although the executive may have broad statutory discretion to
consider all available information and circumstances, executive
clemency should be granted only where the convicted petitioner can: (1) establish actual innocence, or at least raise more than
compelling doubts about guilt, or (2) demonstrate a failure of
legal due process.7 In other words, the discretionary exercise of
the clemency power should be limited to cases where the petitioner’s conviction and death sentence is either fatally flawed
on the facts or in meaningful violation of legal process.
This current interpretation of clemency has the perceived advantage of appearing, on first thought, as fair, judicious, rational, and respectful of the judicial process and the
role of the jury in that process. It positions clemency as a type
of fail-safe; a final review by the governor to make sure that the
state is executing those actually guilty and properly convicted.
However, the seeming legitimacy of this meaning disappears
once probed beneath the surface.
Limiting clemency to this meaning – actual innocence
or deprivation of due process – is: (1) entirely at odds with a
clemency process established in virtually all states that grants
the governor broad discretion to consider the widest possible
range of factors and information; (2) inconsistent with the historical, legal and moral role of clemency under the common law
and the Constitution of the United States; (3) inappropriately
deferential to the judicial process and, as such, shields executives from their responsibility to evaluate the need for mercy;
and (4) ultimately results in a clemency process devoid of any
meaning. Rather, to have any real force, the meaning of
clemency must include, incorporate, and embody the values
expressed in Dr. Johnson’s definition of mercy and humanity.
To properly analyze and define the scope of the
clemency power, it is both necessary and instructive to first
examine the source of that power. While now formally set forth
in statutes, the executive clemency power possessed by the governors of the fifty states flows directly from long-standing common law principles and traditions8 -- the same principles and
traditions that form the foundation of the pardon power
bestowed upon the President by the Founders in Article II,
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Section 2 of the Constitution.9 In 1833, Chief Justice John
Marshall described the basis and scope of the Presidential pardon power in the following sweeping terms:
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
intrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from
the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official, act of the
executive magistrate . . .10
Since 1833, the Supreme Court has consistently reiterated and reinforced this interpretation of the pardon power and
executive clemency as being a discretionary act encompassing
information and factors outside the court system. As stated in
1998 by Chief Justice William Rehnquist in terms that echoed
Chief Justice Marshall’s words:
[T]he heart of executive clemency, which is to grant
clemency as a matter of grace, thus allowing the executive to consider a wide range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing
determinations.11
Against this guidance and instruction from the Supreme Court,
we look at the two-part clemency test that has now become
widely accepted: First, can the petitioner prove his or her innocence? Or second, can the petitioner prove a failure of due
process?
Looking at this test afresh, but mindful of the Supreme
Court’s words, we can all agree that when a convicted and condemned prisoner proves his or her actual innocence (presumably after years on death row), it is no great act of grace to grant
that prisoner freedom. Nor is it an act of mercy or humanity,
rather, it is simply what is due. The release of a person wrongfully convicted of a crime is no act of discretion, but rather, is
mandatory. It is not clemency, but exoneration.
The same holds true for a person wrongly convicted,
imprisoned, and sentenced to death as a result of a violation of
legal due process. Again, it is no great act of grace, mercy, or
humanity to halt the execution of a person wrongfully convicted. Rather, it is what is due. It is not discretionary, but mandatory that the execution of the death sentence in such a case be
withheld pending further and appropriate legal proceedings.
Therefore, if clemency is constrained to mean an
inquiry and process solely directed at sparing the wrongfully
convicted — either legally or factually — from a death sentence, then we have so limited the meaning, scope, and exercise
of the clemency power as to define it virtually out of existence.
Simply put, there is no executive discretion to be exercised, no
grace, mercy, or humanity to be had in sparing the wrongfully
convicted from execution. This is what the law minimally
requires, and limiting clemency to this inquiry effectively
reduces the clemency process to, at its most robust, a final
review by the governor as to whether the state intends to execute an innocent man or woman. In other words, under this limited meaning, clemency is entirely coterminous with the minimal due process requirement that the state not execute the
wrongly (factually or legally) convicted.
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Historically, however, clemency has meant much
examples of clemency are found in ancient sources including,
more: a broadly discretionary act by an executive free to examof course, multiple incidents of the denial or granting of
ine sources of information and circumstances beyond the ken of
clemency in the Old and New Testaments.
the courts and the jury, including mitigating circumstances,
This long history of clemency — and the power immerehabilitation and redemption, the wisdom, justice and propormorial of kings, governors and other executives to grant
tionality of the death sentence, and the mental state of the peticlemency in the exercise of their discretion — is reflected in the
tioner — in short, not just innocence or guilt, but mercy and
English common law foundations of the clemency power.
humanity.
The Clemency Power at Common Law
In this light, we address two fundamental questions
here: How has the definition of clemency changed since our
Under English criminal law, the clemency or pardon
Founding Fathers wrote it into the Constitution? And, what
power of the king was discretionary, largely unfettered and
does the current definition mean for the future of clemency?
viewed as an act of mercy. As defined by Lord Coke, a pardon
We address these questions through first reviewing the
was “a work of mercy, whereby the King, either before attainfoundations of the clemency power through history, common
der, sentence, or conviction, or after, forgiveth any crime,
law and the U.S. Constitution. Second, we evaluate the
offence, punishment [or] execution.”15
Similarly, William
Supreme Court’s remarkably consistent views on clemency,
Hawkins writes in his famous treatise, Pleas of the Crown, in
both substantively and procedurally, as articulated in Supreme
the context of whether the king could issue conditional pardons,
Court opinions spanning almost 175 years. Third, we discuss
“It seems agreed, that the King may extend his mercy of what
shifting views of criminal justice in the latter half of the twenterms he pleases, and consequently may annex
tieth century, as those views affect clemency,
particularly, the dramatic decline in the use of Thus, many of the newly inde- to his pardon any condition that he thinks fit.”16
William Blackstone (while taking note of
clemency to commute death sentences since
pendent states delegated the
Gregg v. Georgia. Finally, as a case study, we clemency responsibility to the some specific limitations on the king’s pardon
consider the clemency process in California,
legislature or to a combination power) clearly expressed the general nature of
the king’s pardon power and its foundation in
and the effect of that process on the practical
of the legislature and the gov- the concept of mercy, in his chapter, Reprieves
meaning of clemency.
ernor. Concerns about vesting and Pardons. After discussing possible bases
Part 1: The Foundations
for a judicial reprieve, Blackstone writes:
the clemency power in the
of the Clemency Power
If neither pregnancy, insanity, non-identity,
chief executive remained very
nor other pleas will avail to avoid the judgmuch alive at the time of the
ment, and stay the execution consequent
While the source of clemency power in
Constitution Convention...
thereupon, the last and surest resort is the
the United States is directly traceable to comking’s most gracious pardon; the granting of
mon law foundations, and this article focuses on
which is the most amiable prerogative of the crown.
the meaning and process of clemency in that legal context, it is
Laws (says an able writer) cannot be framed on prinnevertheless necessary to recognize that the common law
ciples of compassion to guilt: yet justice, by the conclemency power did not spring from a vacuum. The exercise of
stitution of England, is bound to be administered in
clemency power by the executive has existed as long as recordmercy: this is promised by the king in his coronation
ed history. Indeed, it unquestionably pre-dates written laws, to
oath, and it is that act of his government, which is the
a time when cavemen sat around the fire and a tribal leader was
most personal, and most entirely his own. The king
charged with final authority whether to inflict expulsion or
himself condemns no man; that rugged task he leaves
death upon a member who had transgressed the tribe’s code of
to his courts of justice: the great operation of his
behavior, or whether to show mercy.12 The clemency power, in
scepter is mercy.17
short, has existed wherever and whenever the power to decide
the fate of another rested in one individual’s hands. In terms of
written codes, the pardon power of the executive explicitly
The king’s pardon power was delegated to his goverappears in the Code of Hammurabi, one of the earliest known
nors in the American colonies. As with the king’s clemency, the
written codes of laws, promulgated by the ruler of Babylon in
clemency power of the colonial governors was not governed by
approximately 1780 BCE and carved into a stone monument on
any rules but was purely discretionary.18
public display. The Code of Hammurabi, which could perhaps
be best described as a set of rules for regulating the affairs of
The Framers of the Constitution
society, combined elements of both a civil and criminal code.
In the context of marital transgressions, it provided: “If a man’s
After gaining their independence from the British
wife be surprised (in flagrante delicto) with another man, both
crown, many of the original colonial governments were undershall be tied and thrown into the water, but the husband may
standably reluctant to vest unrestrained power in a chief execupardon his wife and the king his slaves.” (emphasis added).13 It
tive. Thus, many of the newly independent states delegated the
is interesting, for our purposes, that the written text of the Code
clemency responsibility to the legislature or to a combination of
of Hammurabi places no restrictions on the king’s decision
the legislature and the governor. Concerns about vesting the
whether to grant a pardon, but appears to leave it to the discreclemency power in the chief executive remained very much
tion of the king.
alive at the time of the Constitution Convention, where there
Moving forward in time, the Romans had highly
was a meaningful debate whether to place the pardon power in
developed customs of issuing pardons, granting great discretion
the hands of the chief executive or the legislature. Ultimately,
to the executive, and Caesar, renowned for his generalship and
the Framers vested the pardon power in the presidency, but only
toughness, was equally lauded (not least, by himself) for his
after considering and rejecting several suggestions to restrict
exercise of compassion and clemency.14 Numerous other
the scope of the president’s pardon power, including a motion
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that would have allowed the President to grant pardons only
with the consent of the Senate.19
However, and more importantly, while there was disagreement over residing the pardon power with the president or
the legislature, “the Framers were aware that the pardoning
power should be delegated so as to be independent of the judiciary, and therefore act as a check on the courts.”20 Indeed, the
Framers understood the pardon power to be an obligation of the
office and a vital check on Congress and the Judiciary.21
Alexander Hamilton and future Supreme Court Justice
James Iredell, influenced by the writings of John Locke,22 were
two of the most vocal proponents of the pardon power resting
in the unfettered hands of the executive, with discretion to act
in the interests of justice, broadly defined. Hamilton wrote in
The Federalist Papers No. 74:
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the
benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as
possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of
every country partakes so much of necessary severity,
that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of
unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance
too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest in proportion as it is undivided,
it may be inferred that a single man would be most
ready to attend to the force of those motives, which
might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law.23
James Iredell argued strongly in favor of the exercise of mercy
within the pardon power, and the use of clemency to protect
against injustices:
[T]here may be many instances where, though a man
offends against the letter of the law, yet particular circumstances in his case may entitle him to mercy. It is
impossible for any general law to foresee and provide
for all possible cases that may arise; and therefore an
inflexible adherence to it, in every instance, might frequently be the cause of very great injustice. For this
reason, such a power ought to exist somewhere; and
where could it be more properly vested, than in a man
who had received such strong proofs of his possessing
the highest confidence of the people?24
Iredell, while recognizing the risks of executive power,25 also
strongly argued for an unrestricted pardon power as shielding
against arbitrary limitations and limiting the exercise of wisdom
in circumstances where all “possible contingencies” could not
be foreseen:

is most striking for its consistency, the Supreme Court has interpreted and framed the executive clemency power as a discretionary act of grace, stemming from the common law pardon
power of the English king.28 In this line of cases, the Court has
characterized and positioned this discretionary clemency
power, both procedurally and constitutionally, as an integral
part of our criminal justice system that nevertheless resides outside of the judicial system where it is neither (a) burdened by
the constraints of the judicial process in terms of the type of
information that may be considered or the process applied, nor
(b) subject to any meaningful review by the courts.29
The Pre-Furman Cases
In 1830, United States v. Wilson30 was the first
clemency case to reach the Supreme Court. President Andrew
Jackson, for reasons not given in the opinion, gave a presidential pardon to a mail-robber named Wilson after he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to death. However, Wilson apparently did not want the pardon and did not present it to the court
below. The Court, using language from contract law, and reasoning that the pardon had to be presented to the court below for
it to be effective, held the pardon power could not be used to
save Wilson’s life if Wilson did not want his life saved.31 In
reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Marshall discussed the
history and exercise of the pardon power, writing: “The power
of pardon, in criminal cases, has been exercised from time
immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is
our language, and . . . it is a constituent part of the judicial system . . .”32 The Chief Justice further made clear, (as quoted in
full in the introduction, above) that the pardon power was an act
of “grace” within the discretion of the President.33
Twenty-two years later in Ex parte Wells,34 President
Fillmore pardoned Wells on the condition that Wells remain in
prison for life, bringing before the Court the issue whether the
President could grant a conditional pardon. Relying in primary
measure upon the right of the English king to grant conditional
pardons, the Court upheld the conditional pardon granted to
Wells. In his opinion for the Court, which drew heavily upon
English common law sources and commentary, Justice James
Wayne described clemency as a mechanism to both correct mistakes and exercise mercy:
Without such a power of clemency, to be exercised by
some department or functionary of a government, it
would be most imperfect and deficient in its political
morality, and in that attribute of deity whose judgments are always tempered with mercy.
*

When a power is acknowledged to be necessary, it is a
very dangerous thing to prescribe limits to it, for men
must have a greater confidence in their own wisdom
than I think any men are entitled to, who imagine they
can form such exact ideas of all possible contingencies
as to be sure that the restriction they propose will not
do more harm than good.26
The state clemency power was reallocated into the
hands of most state governors as state constitutions adopted
pardon provisions that largely mirrored the federal provision in
the newly ratified Constitution.27
Part 2: The Supreme Court and Clemency

*

*

A pardon is said by Lord Coke to be a work of mercy,
whereby the kind, either before attainder, sentence or
conviction, or after, forgiveth any crime, offence, punishment, execution. . . And the king’s coronation oath
is ‘that he will cause justice to be executed in mercy.’
It is frequently conditional, and he may extend his
mercy upon what terms he pleases …35
In Ex parte Garland,36 decided in 1866, the Court
rejected the notion that the coordinate branches of government
could limit the executive’s pardon power. Justice Stephen Field
wrote for the Court:
The [pardon] power thus conferred is unlimited, with

In an unbroken line of cases dating back to 1830 that
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the exception [in cases of impeachment]. It extends to
every offence known to the law, and may be exercised
at any time after its commission, either before legal
proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or
after conviction and judgment. This power of the
President is not subject to legislative control. Congress
can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude
from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign
prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered
by any legislative restrictions.37
In 1925, in Ex parte Grossman,38 the Court continued
its course of affirming the value and discretionary nature of
executive clemency. Chief Justice William Howard Taft interpreted the clemency power broadly at the expense of the judiciary in holding that the President must have full discretion in
exercising the clemency power, even when granting clemency
for criminal contempt of court:

beyond review by the courts. He reasoned:
Postponement of execution because of insanity bears a
close affinity not to trial for a crime but rather to
reprieves of sentences in general. The power to
reprieve has usually sprung from the same source as
the power to pardon … Such power has traditionally
rested in governors or the President, although some of
that power is often delegated to agencies such as pardon or parole boards. Seldom, if ever, has this power
of executive clemency been subjected to review by the
courts.44
In considering the lack of an adversarial hearing as bearing
upon the evidence considered by the governor, Black noted the
lack of any record as to whether the governor had declined to
hear “any statements on petitioner’s behalf” and then stated
what must have seemed like an obvious assumption: “We
would suppose that most if not all governors, like most if not all
judges, would welcome any information which might be suggested in cases where human lives depend
upon their decision.”45

The administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily always wise or certainly con
siderate of circumstances which may
Four years after Furman, the
properly mitigate guilt. To afford a
efforts of states to rewrite their
remedy, it has always been thought
death penalty statutes proved sucessential in popular governments, as
cessful, when the Court upheld the
well as in monarchies, to vest in some
death penalty statutes of Florida,
other authority than the courts power
Texas and Georgia in Gregg v.
to ameliorate or avoid particular crimGeorgia -- a decision that was
inal judgments. It is a check entrustunderstandably viewed as both the
ed to the executive for special cases.
Supreme Court’s stamp of
To exercise it to the extent of destroyapproval on the constitutionality
ing the deterrent effect of judicial
of the death penalty and a green
punishment would be to prevent it;
light to restart executions.
but whoever is to make it useful must
have full discretion to exercise it.39
Two years later, in Biddle v. Perovich,40 the Court
affirmed, again, the President’s power to grant a conditional
pardon: in this case, upholding the commutation of a death sentence to life in prison, where the convicted petitioner asserted
he had not consented to the condition. In reaching this result,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes continued the theme first sounded by Chief Justice Marshall, writing that clemency was an integral part of the justice system: “It is a part of the Constitutional
scheme. When granted, it is the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment had fixed.”41
In Solesbee v. Balkcom,42 decided in 1950, the Court
addressed the important role played by clemency in our criminal justice system in the context of a challenge to the constitutionality of the state of Georgia’s process for reviewing the sanity of a prisoner scheduled to be executed. Petitioner was convicted of murder, and appealed to the Georgia governor to postpone his execution on the grounds that he had become insane
while in prison. Under the applicable Georgia statutes, which
gave the governor broad discretion how to proceed, the governor appointed three physicians to examine the petitioner and all
three “declared him sane.” Petitioner argued that he was entitled under the due process clause to a more judicial style hearing — i.e. an adversarial style hearing with representation by
counsel and the right to present evidence and examine witnesses.43 In upholding the constitutionality of the state’s process,
Justice Hugo Black distinguished the process of determining
post-conviction sanity from a trial procedure (to which full due
process protection would presumably attach) and drew a parallel instead to clemency, which traditionally has been essentially
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Furman and Gregg

While executions in the United States were
relatively commonplace early in the twentieth
century, executions steadily declined from
1930 until the 1960s.46 Indeed, public support
of the death penalty reached its lowest level in
1966 at forty-two percent — a decline often
attributed to a reaction to the Second World
War and the movement of many allied nations
to either abolish or restrict the death penalty.47
Against a backdrop of decreased public support for the death penalty, the civil rights
movement and the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court decided
Furman v. Georgia48 in 1972 and Gregg v. Georgia49 in 1976
— a pair of cases defining the standards of capital punishment
under the Constitution. Although technically not clemency
decisions, Furman and Gregg are integral to any current discussion of clemency. Indeed, in many ways, those decisions were
the twin triggers that initiated the shift in meaning of clemency
from an act of “grace” carrying broad discretion to a limited
review focused on actual innocence and legal error.
In Furman, the Court upheld a challenge to the death
penalty of several states, ruling that the death penalty, as
applied by those states, was unconstitutional because of the
“arbitrary and capricious” manner in which the penalty was
imposed.50 In response, many state legislatures re-wrote their
death penalty statutes in an effort to satisfy Furman’s concerns
about arbitrariness. During this period, when the constitutionality of the death penalty was in question and the procedure
under which individuals on death row had been sentenced had
been declared unconstitutional, a number of states commuted
the sentences of their entire death row. However, four years
after Furman, the efforts of states to rewrite their death penalty
statutes proved successful, when the Court upheld the death
penalty statutes of Florida, Texas and Georgia in Gregg v.
Georgia — a decision that was understandably viewed as both
the Supreme Court’s stamp of approval on the constitutionality
of the death penalty and a green light to restart executions.
Even though the Court had stressed the importance
of clemency in no less than seven cases before Gregg, and
has continued to reiterate the importance of clemency since
Gregg, grants of clemency have declined precipitously
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since that decision. The best statistics available indicate that
clemencies were granted at a rate of about twenty-five percent
for the first two-thirds of this century,51 but since Furman and
Gregg that rate has dropped to less than six percent52 with fewer
than two percent being granted for humanitarian reasons.53
Understanding this decline in the granting of clemency and the reasons behind it are critical to any discussion of the
appropriate meaning and process of clemency. A series of factors starting with the decision in Gregg and including shifting
theories of criminal justice, a perception that the fairness of the
legal system has increased overall, and the politics of the death
penalty, appear to explain in main part the decline in the exercise of the clemency power. Furthermore, these factors collectively illustrate the view that clemency should be limited to situations of actual innocence or legal denial of due process. The
factors leading to this decline are discussed in some detail in
Part 3, below, following a discussion of the two significant
post-Furman, post-Gregg Supreme Court cases addressing
clemency, including Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard,54
the only case in which the Supreme Court has directly
addressed the question of whether clemency decisions are subject to due process review by the courts.
The Post-Furman Cases
In Herrera v. Collins,55 the Supreme Court again
addressed the importance of clemency in the context of a case
challenging the constitutionality of a death sentence. At issue
in Herrera was whether a condemned capital prisoner’s claim
of innocence based on newly discovered evidence was sufficient by itself (without another claim of a constitutional violation) for federal habeas review.56 The Court’s opinion, authored
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, has been interpreted as holding that
even actual innocence was insufficient and has been widely
criticized.57
In reaching its result in Herrera, and in rejecting
Herrera’s claim that he deserved a new trial to consider exculpatory evidence, the majority relied on executive clemency as a
fail-safe; as being the mechanism available for vindicating
those who are actually innocent.58 Indeed, some of the most
sweeping and widely quoted language in support of clemency
comes from the pens of Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the
Herrera majority, and Justice Scalia’s concurrence. Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained:
Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and it is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriage of justice where judicial process has
been exhausted. In England, the clemency power was
vested in the Crown and can be traced back to the
700s . . . Executive clemency has provided the ‘fail
safe’ in our criminal justice system . . . It is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human
beings who administer it, is fallible.59
Justice Scalia echoed the majority’s reliance on clemency by
declaring: “With any luck, we shall avoid ever having to face
this embarrassing question again, since it is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today’s opinion requires
would fail to produce an executive pardon.”60
Finally, in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, the
Court directly considered whether clemency could be subject to
due process review. At issue in Woodard was the constitutionality of the state of Ohio’s clemency procedures. Under the
Ohio Constitution and statutes, the governor had the ultimate
and discretionary power to grant clemency as he or she deemed
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appropriate, however, the first stage of review was delegated to
the Ohio Adult Parole Authority.61 Within forty-five days of a
scheduled execution, the Parole Authority was required to conduct a clemency hearing, prior to which the condemned inmate
could request an interview with one or more of the parole
authority members without counsel for the inmate present.
Following the hearing, the Parole Authority was required to
make a recommendation to the governor.62 Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the interview process – including
the lack of any right to have counsel present – asserting it violated the due process clause. On proceedings below, the Eight
Circuit held that some level of minimal due process was, in fact,
required for the clemency proceedings, and remanded to the
District Court to determine whether Ohio’s procedures met
those minimal standards. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The issue squarely before the Court was whether condemned inmates had a protected life or liberty interest in state
clemency proceedings such that they were subject to due
process review, and, if so, what level of review was required.
While Woodard is generally, and we believe properly, read as
requiring some very minimal due process review, the Court was
unable to produce a clear majority opinion on this question.63
Procedurally, there was a clear majority to reverse the decision
of the Eight Circuit. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, wrote the core opinion for the
Court, holding that state clemency procedures were not subject
to any due process review.64 In coming to this conclusion, the
Chief Justice again stressed, as he had in Herrera, the discretionary nature of clemency and its place outside the judicial system:
An examination of the function and significance of the
discretionary clemency decision at issue here readily
shows it is far different from [a first right to appeal.]
Clemency proceedings are not part of the trial – or
even the adjudicatory process. They do not determine
the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and are not
intended primarily to enhance the reliability of the trial
process. They are conducted by the executive branch,
independent of direct appeal and collateral relief proceedings. And they are usually discretionary, unlike
the more structured and limited scope of judicial proceedings. While traditionally available to capital
defendants as a final and alternative avenue of relief,
clemency has not traditionally ‘been the business of
courts.’65
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist’s opinion may be read to
argue that to subject clemency to a high due process threshold
would be to effectively extinguish it. Drawing on the Court’s
traditional view of clemency, Rehnquist stated that “the heart of
executive clemency is to grant clemency as a matter of grace,
thus allowing the executive to consider a wide range of factors
not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing determinations.”66 Later in the opinion, Rehnquist contrasts
this view of clemency with that proposed by the petitioner:
“Here, the executive’s clemency authority would cease to be a
matter of grace . . . if it were constrained by the sort of procedural requirements that respondent urges.”67
In an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment,
Justice O’Connor joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer, while not disagreeing with the view of clemency posited by Justice Rehnquist, found that the Eighth Circuit had been
correct in concluding that some “minimal procedural safeguards
apply to clemency proceedings.”68 As an example, Justice
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O’Connor noted that judicial intervention “might . . . be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state official flipped a
coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where
a State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency
process.”69 Similarly, Justice Stevens, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, argued that clemency proceedings could,
under certain circumstances, violate due process, pointing to
procedures “infected by bribery, personal or political animosity,
or the deliberate falsification of false evidence.”70
No court has yet found a violation of due process
applying the Woodard standard. Although the lack of any
meaningful due process review may have harsh outcomes,71
this is generally consistent with the historical role of clemency
as a discretionary act of grace residing outside of the judicial
system.
Part 3: The Decline of Clemency
As described above, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Gregg opened the doors for states to resume executions,
there has been a meaningful decline in the exercise of clemency, and a steady narrowing of the scope of clemency review to
situations of actual innocence or violation of legal due process.
In broad measure, the decline in the use of clemency can be
traced to three causes; a shift from a redemptive to a retributive
theory of justice, a perception that the court system has
achieved a greater degree of overall fairness, and the politics of
the death penalty.
Shifting Theories of Criminal Justice
During the 1950s and 1960s, a redemptive theory of
justice was largely prevalent throughout the criminal justice
system and evidenced in clemency decisions.72 For instance,
the following statement made by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner
when commuting the sentence of convicted murderer Paul
Crump in 1962 captures the rehabilitative ethos of that time:
The most significant goal of a system of penology in a
civilized society is the rehabilitation of one of its
members who, for a variety of complex reasons, has
violated the laws of the society. If that premise were
to be denied, solely because it is a capital case, a great
disservice would be done to what we hopefully
embrace as the ultimate goal of this system.
What has troubled me is how the concept of rehabilitation can be judged and evaluated in a case where the
process of law, after the extensive review permitted
every defendant by our concern for justice, has determined that a man committed a crime so repugnant as
to merit a sentence of death.
*

*

*

We must, however, be able to hold forth to others the
hope that they can look forward to a useful life – to life
itself – if they will make the necessary effort to face
squarely their past actions and the alternatives.73
At the time of his conviction for murder during an armed robbery, Paul Crump’s own attorney called him a “beastly, animalistic, illiterate criminal.” However, while in prison, Crump read
widely, studied the Bible and became a person of faith, helped
care for other prisoners, and defended a guard who was attacked
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by another inmate.74 In commuting Crump’s sentence,
Governor Kerner recognized that, “[u]nder these circumstances,
it would serve no useful purpose to society to take this man’s
life.”75
The redemptive theory of justice was similarly echoed
by Terry Sanford, Governor of Georgia from 1961 to 1965, in
his description of the clemency process:
The courts of our state and nation exercise in the name
of the people the powers of administration of justice.
… The executive is charged with the exercise in the
name of the people of an … equally important attitude
of a healthy society – that of mercy beyond the strict
framework of the law. The use of executive clemency
is not a criticism of the courts, either express or
implied. I have no criticism of any court or any judge.
Executive clemency does not involve the changing of
any judicial determination. It does not eliminate punishment; it does consider rehabilitation … It falls to
the Governor to blend mercy with justice, as best he
can, involving human as well as legal considerations,
in the light of all circumstances after the passage of
time, but before justice is allowed to overrun mercy in
the name of the power of the state. I fully realize that
reasonable men hold strong feelings on both sides of
every case where executive clemency is indicated. I
accepted the responsibility of being Governor, however, and I will not shy away from the responsibility of
exercising the power of executive clemency.76
However, in the years since the Supreme Court decided Furman and Gregg, rehabilitation has been widely discarded
as a goal of the penal system. In its place, a retributive theory
of justice – of “just desserts” – where the measure of the punishment should be a function of the seriousness of the crime and
the culpability of the offender, has largely taken over.77 The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines is but one example of the retributive theory of justice in action – a misguided attempt (and
one ultimately found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court)78
by a Congressionally authorized federal sentencing body to
impose sentences and judge human beings by matrix. This
matrix took into account, for example, the crime and the
amount of the loss by the victim, but made virtually no
allowance for the character of the accused as reflected in provable good deeds or service to this country.79
Since the 1970s, retributivists have advocated for
reforming clemency in keeping with a retributivist criminal justice philosophy. This philosophy includes replacing executive
discretion with substantive, normative standards that would
control who receives clemency.80 According to retributivists,
mercy can only be shown by someone who has been wronged
or to whom a debt is owed, and therefore, the government is not
in the best position to grant mercy, as it is not the one who has
been wronged.81 Moreover, to retributivists, nothing the
offender does after sentencing is relevant to clemency.82 If retributivism is accepted, then clemency as grace, mercy or a
reflection of our common humanity is never justified.83 Rather,
the only grounds for clemency are innocence, denial of due
process, or excessive punishment when measured against the
crime.84
The Perception Of Legal Fairness
It is likely that clemency has declined in part because
of the widespread perception that courts have resolved legal
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George H.W. Bush administrations, succinctly summed up this
problems in the application of the death penalty. 85 This perception (the truth of which is, of course, another matter) stems
view: “The feeling is that we should do as little as possible to
from, among other reasons: a reduction in the number of
grant relief . . . It’s a dangerous trend for the executive to overoffenses for which a convicted defendant may receive the death
ride the function of the courts and the parole system too much,
penalty, including the distinction between degrees of murder;
both from the point of view of balance of power and of possithe end of mandatory death sentences and the discretion to
ble corruption.”98
determine life or death being put in the hands of the jury; the
This assertion, when taken to its logical conclusion,
introduction of bifurcated capital trials, which divide the delibculminates in the view, so clearly expressed by George Bush as
eration over guilt from the deliberation over sentencing; the latGovernor of Texas, that decisions about the death penalty “are
itude given to the defense to introduce mitigating evidence durprimarily the responsibility of the judicial branch,” and that the
ing sentencing; and recent limitations on the classes of individjob of the governor is not to “replace the verdict of a jury,” but
uals eligible for death, e.g., minors.86
“to ask two questions: is the person guilty of the crime? And did
In addition, there is the perception that appellate courts
the person have full access to the courts of law?”99
will rectify legal injustices and order new trials and proceedings
as appropriate. While over half of all death sentences are now
Part 4: The State Clemency Process
reversed in state or federal appellate courts, this could be read
to show either how well appellate review functions in catching
As a general matter, the clemency processes adopted
errors,87 or simply that many errors exist in death sentences.
by the fifty states are consistent not with the limited view of
Either way, there can be little question that “the perceived perclemency (innocence or denial of due process), but with the traformance of trial and appellate courts in capital cases is a powditional meaning of clemency as described by
erful factor in rationalizing gubernatorial refusal
the Supreme Court; a discretionary process,
88
to commute death sentences.”
where the governor may review the broadest
The accuracy of trial court convictions Clemency is, and has always spectrum of information and circumstances, is
resulting in death sentences, and the efficacy of been, a highly political exer- not required to expound upon his or her reason
the review of those convictions and sentences in cise of power. Historically for granting or withholding clemency, and
the appellate courts, is beyond the scope of this clemency has been used to where a grant of clemency may take different
article. However, we must note the obvious and reward political supporters forms including the grant of a reprieve, stay,
the well-documented fact that over 200 convict- and fulfill campaign promis- commutation of a sentence of death, or full pares, to raise money for the
ed men and women have now been fully exonexecutive and to ‘“endear don.
erated on the basis of DNA evidence alone,
This general statement holds essentially true
the sovereign to his subincluding 15 death row prisoners.89 The courts
even
though we must, of course, recognize that
jects.’”
are human institutions, and it is not now, and
each state has its own system of clemency, and
never will be, possible to say that all criminal
that any general discussion about clemency nectrial convictions are just, or that the appellate
essarily oversimplifies the fact that there are
process rights all wrongs. That criminal defenreally fifty-two different state clemency schemes and that these
dants facing capital charges now receive a better trial, or have
schemes are applied differently in different cases. Further,
increased appellate review, is certainly important and meaningmany states allocate at least some of the clemency power to
ful, but it is no reason to limit clemency review to innocence or
state pardon boards or similar bodies. In total, fourteen states
denial of due process.
are almost directly modeled after the federal pardon power and
Politics
Clemency is, and has always been, a highly political
exercise of power. Historically clemency has been used to
reward political supporters and fulfill campaign promises, to
raise money for the executive and to ‘“endear the sovereign to
his subjects.’”90 “From ancient Athens to post-Vietnam
America, timely extensions of mercy have often been used in
moments of turmoil to bind together a social fabric in danger of
rending.”91
Politics is always a consideration in clemency cases,
and to pretend otherwise is to be willfully naïve.92 The last
three decades in particular have seen the rise of politicians who
are “tough on crime,” which is often equated with being in
favor of the death penalty.93 Since the defeat of Michael
Dukakis in the 1988 presidential election, all presidential candidates from both major parties have unequivocally supported
the death penalty.94 Following suit, the accepted political wisdom for governors is that a position against the death penalty
can end a governor’s political future.95 Also consistent with the
national get tough on crime rhetoric is a focus on the victim in
both the political and legal arenas.96
One of the main political considerations militating
against clemency is the belief that governors should not replace
the decisions of judges or juries.97 Raymond Theim, Deputy
United States Pardon Attorney during the Carter, Reagan, and
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give the governor sole authority without the advice and/or consent of a board; ten states allow the governor to make a pardon
decision with the non-binding advice of a board; eleven states
have a shared power model where the governor sits on the pardon board with other officials or is required to have a recommendation from a board or advisory group; and three states vest
their pardon and parole boards with final pardon decision making authority, bypassing the governor all together.100
As a case study for purposes of this article, we look at
the clemency procedures used in California, which currently
has the largest number of death row prisoners of any state101
and whose stated procedure of vesting sole authority over
clemency decisions with the governor is consistent with the traditional meaning and role of clemency.
The California Clemency Process
As a matter of history, the death penalty was reinstated in California in 1977. However, no execution took place in
California until 1992. Since that time, thirteen individuals have
been executed in California. Most recently, Clarence Ray Allen
was executed by lethal injection on January 19, 2006. The last
governor of California to grant clemency was Ronald Reagan in
1967.102
Ultimately, whether to grant clemency is an entirely
discretionary decision of the California governor, and he or she
has broad discretion whether to hold any sort of clemency hear-
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ing and may consider or ignore any of the information presented to him. However, the state has set out a process that allows
for a certain formality, should the governor so desire. We look
here first at the “formal process,” recognizing that it is ultimately highly discretionary and variable depending upon the wishes
of the governor. Next, we examine the process actually used by
California Governor Schwarzenegger in the five clemency
appeals that have come before him since he took office in 2003.
The Formal Process
The formal process of applying for clemency begins
with contacting the Governor’s office in Sacramento and
obtaining an Application for Executive Clemency.103 The
application may be requested at any time, and the petitioner
does not need to wait for an execution date to be set to request
an application. The application includes the action being
requested, personal information about the petitioner, information about petitioner’s felony convictions, and a statement
requesting clemency, including the circumstances of the
offense, rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated, prison record,
and the reasons the request should be granted. In accordance
with California Penal Code section 4804, a Notice of Intention
to Apply for Executive Clemency must be sent to each district
attorney in each county where the petitioner was convicted of a
felony.104 The district attorney must complete and sign the
Acknowledgment of Receipt portion of the Notice. In capital
cases where certiorari has been sought from the Supreme Court,
the State of California will ordinarily move immediately upon a
denial of certiorari to set an execution date. Setting an execution date requires a hearing before the court in the district where
the petitioner was convicted. The petitioner must be given at
least ten days notice of this hearing, with the court having limited discretion to set an execution date up to sixty days after the
hearing.105 At the time of the hearing, the various state offices
involved in the execution process will have ordinarily already
conferred with the Governor’s office, San Quentin prison officials, and frequently the State Supreme Court and already
decided upon an execution date. This leaves the state court
judge presiding over this hearing with little, if any, discretion.
Once the execution date is set, the Governor’s Legal
Affairs Secretary asks the petitioner’s counsel if clemency is to
be sought and sets due dates for; (1) the Application / Clemency
Petition, (2) the district attorney’s opposition, and (3) petitioner’s reply to the opposition. While some petitioners may do little more than complete the Application for Clemency, in all
cases of which we are aware, petitioners, through their counsel,
have submitted meaningful clemency petitions setting forth
both traditional and novel reasons for the granting of clemency
including evidence of innocence or wrongful conviction, mitigating personal factors, evidence of mental illness, service to
this country, statements from the families of victims, and evidence of rehabilitation. At any time, the Governor may in his
or her discretion refer the petitioner’s clemency application to
the Board of Prison Terms (BPT), and may request an investigation, a recommendation, or both from the BPT.106
In actual fact, the BPT typically does not wait for a
request from the Governor to begin an investigation, but begins
that process once a condemned inmate’s direct legal appeals are
over. Indeed, we have been informed that the BPT has frequently completed its investigation and prepared its report by
the time the Application is received. In conducting its review,
the BPT would ordinarily contact, among others, the prosecuting attorney for the original offense, the judge who presided at
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the petitioner’s trial, and the families of victims to obtain statements. Once their review is complete, the BPT’s report would
typically offer a summary of the offense, prior convictions, and
prison behavior, provide information regarding decisions in the
case, offer a biographical sketch of the petitioner and the petitioner’s criminal history, and consider psychological and medical records.
While the petitioner may request a hearing in front of
the BPT, the petitioner no right to any hearing, but rather this is
within the discretion of the Governor. If the Governor grants a
hearing, it will ordinarily be held within a week or two of the
scheduled execution. In the past, BPT hearings have typically
been open forums, where any “interested party” could address
the Board. However, the Governor may direct that the BPT
hearing be held in private. Similarly, the Governor may set
such time limits and other rules for the hearings as he wishes.
We are not aware of any recent case where the petitioner has
physically attended the hearings, due to apparent security concerns, but petitioners have appeared by videotape to make an
appeal.
Following their review, including any hearing, the
BPT submits a non-binding, private recommendation to the
Governor. The Governor has complete discretion whether to
take the Board’s recommendation or to make it public. If it is
not made public, the petitioner will not be notified of the
Board’s recommendation. In lieu of, or in addition to a review
by the BPT, the Governor may schedule his or her own clemency review including a hearing. In such event, the Governor
would ordinarily meet with counsel for petitioner and the district attorney in his office. The Governor may also invite family members of the victims or other interested parties to such a
hearing, and may seek a statement from the petitioner. In all
cases, whether to hold a hearing, and what format such a hearing would take, is completely discretionary with the Governor.
Similarly, the Governor may consider or disregard whatever
information he or she wishes.
If the governor grants clemency, the California
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigations
are notified, the clemency is filed with the Secretary of State,
reported to the Legislature, and becomes a matter of public
record. If the governor decides not to grant clemency, the execution will proceed on schedule unless a court or the President
of the United States intervenes. It is typical for California governors to issue written statements explaining their grant or
denial of clemency.
The Process Used by Governor Schwarzenegger
In his four years in office, Governor Schwarzenegger
has presided over five clemency applications, establishing different procedures for each.107
1. Kevin Cooper
Less than three months after taking office, on January,
2004, Governor Schwarzenegger was faced with his first petition for clemency from Kevin Cooper. Cooper had been convicted on four counts of first-degree murder and one count of
attempted murder after escaping from prison in 1983. His
clemency appeal raised, in main part, questions about the validity of his conviction, including the destruction of a potentially
significant piece of evidence by the police, and requested a stay
to allow additional labratory testing of key evidence to be performed. It also discussed his rehabilitation while in prison.
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Governor Schwarzenegger denied Cooper’s petition
without seeking any recommendation from the BPT and without holding any hearing of his own, thus making Cooper the
first death row prisoner to be denied a clemency hearing since
the death penalty was reinstated in California in 1978. In denying clemency for Cooper, Schwarzenegger wrote, “I have carefully weighed the claims . . . . Evidence establishing his guilt
was overwhelming, and his conversion to faith and his mentoring of others, while commendable, does not diminish the cruelty and destruction he has inflicted on so many. His is not a case
for clemency.”108 Cooper’s life was spared when the Ninth
Circuit unexpectedly intervened at the last moment to allow a
new evidentiary hearing and for the labratory testing Cooper
sought.

was a witness against him, while he was serving a life sentence
for another murder. He was blind, diabetic, nearly deaf, and
confined to a wheelchair at the time his petition was filed. He
sought clemency on the basis of his age and infirmities, and
alleged flaws in his trial and questions as to his guilt.
After
initial
indications
that
Governor
Schwarzenegger would allow a private hearing for Clarence
Ray Allen’s clemency petition, on January 4, 2006,
Schwarzenegger announced that he would not hold any kind of
clemency hearing for Allen. Nine days later, Schwarzenegger
denied clemency stating, “[m]y respect for the rule of law and
review of the facts in this case led to my decision.”112 Allen
was executed on January 17, 2006.
5. Michael Morales

2. Donald Beardslee
The next clemency appeal to come before Governor
Schwarzenegger was that of Donald Beardslee. Beardslee was
convicted on two counts of first-degree murder in California
while on parole for murder in Missouri. Beardslee’s clemency
petition raised no claims of innocence. Instead, he presented
evidence of his profound, lifelong brain damage and his excellent behavior while in prison. Governor Schwarzenegger
referred Beardslee’s petition to the BPT, which recommended
denying clemency. Following the recommendation of the BPT,
and without holding a hearing of his own, Governor
Schwarzenegger denied clemency. He found that Beardslee
could tell the difference between right and wrong at the time of
the crime and, writing of Beardslee’s model behavior in prison,
“I expect no less.”109 Beardslee was executed in January 2005.
3. Stanley Tookie Williams
In late 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger was faced
with a petition for clemency from Stanley Tookie Williams, one
of the founders of the Crips street gang, who had been convicted of four homicides in 1981. While on San Quentin’s death
row for twenty-five years, Stanley Williams had educated himself and had become a well-known anti-gang activist and
author. While there was very limited credible evidence of
Stanley William’s guilt, and although Stanley Williams had
maintained his innocence for twenty-five years there was also
no clear evidence that could establish his innocence. The basis
for his clemency petition was his personal redemption and,
most significantly, the impact of his good work on others, and
the symbol of hope his rehabilitation offered.110
At the request of Stanley William’s counsel (the
authors of this article), the Governor held a private two hour
hearing in his office. The Governor denied a request to meet
with Stanley Williams in person, however, an audiotape message from Mr. Williams to the Governor was played at the
clemency hearing.
Following this hearing, Governor
Schwarzenegger again denied clemency, in a written opinion
focusing on evidence of Mr. William’s guilt and Mr. William’s
refusal to accept responsibility for the crimes of which he was
convicted and which he denied committing.111 Stanley
Williams was executed on December 13, 2005.
4. Clarence Ray Allen
Within approximately a month after the execution of
Stanley Williams, a fourth clemency petition was presented to
Governor Schwarzenegger on behalf of Clarence Ray Allen.
Allen, who was seventy-six years old, had been convicted of
orchestrating the murders of three people, including one who
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The month following Clarence Allen’s execution,
Michael Morales petitioned for clemency. Morales was convicted of murder in 1981 when a jury found that he beat, strangled, stabbed, and raped his victim in a particularly vicious
manner. As with Clarence Ray Allen, Schwarzenegger chose
not to grant Morales a hearing, relying on documents submitted
from the defense and the prosecution to make his decision. On
February 17, 2006 Governor Schwarzenegger issued a
Statement of Decision denying Michael Morales’s petition for
clemency.113 Morales’s execution has been stayed indefinitely
following challenges to the state of California’s procedures for
carrying out executions, and a decision of the District Court for
the Northern District of California which ordered prison officials to have medical personnel present to take part in the execution.114
In sum, each of these petitions for clemency raised different legal and moral claims, presented the Governor with different social and political issues, and the Governor followed a
different process for each. Indeed, in reviewing California’s
clemency process it becomes clear that there is little substantive
process at all. Once the proper paperwork has been filed with
the appropriate agencies, the Governor has discretion to make
whatever decision he sees fit based on all or none of the evidence before him and whatever facts or personal preferences
influence him. In other words, the state of California has set up
a process that is open to the broad exercise of the Governor’s
discretion. It is up to the Governor what he or she makes of that
discretionary process.
In the case of Governor Schwarzenegger, to the extent
he has declined to look beyond the determination of guilt or
innocence as found by a jury (and, other than the narrow window offered by his clemency decisions, only the Governor ultimately knows what he has considered in making his determinations), such a self imposed limitation would, we submit, be at
odds with the historical and moral role played by clemency.
Conclusion
A people confident in its laws and institutions
should not be ashamed of mercy.115
The exercise of the clemency power is, and has always
been, a discretionary act of the executive founded in notions of
grace, mercy and humanity. While some may believe this to be
at odds with our highly procedural judicial system, clemency is
-- by its inherent nature -- a uniquely unbound act residing both
alongside and apart from the criminal justice process. Indeed,
we believe it is a fundamental misapprehension, as to the
essence of clemency, to limit its meaning to actual innocence or
legal denial of due process.
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While such a two part test seems both respectful of the
justice system and process oriented in appearance, in reality, it
serves only to shield the executive from responsibility for the
clemency decision — other than being a last resort against the
execution of the wrongfully convicted. The importance of the
governor’s role as a fail-safe against the execution of the
wrongfully convicted cannot be gainsaid and is one of the reasons why clemency has historically existed. But it is no great
act of discretion, mercy or humanity. Rather, the executive’s
action in such cases is no more than what is minimally required.
Clemency calls for more.
While the criminal justice system has arguably moved
toward an increasing emphasis on procedure, with the intent of
increasing fairness in the system as a whole, clemency is more
properly viewed as the very human act of an executive exercising discretion in light of all available information and circumstances. Clemency, as repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme
Court, is not, and never has been, merely a failsafe or a substitution of the executive’s judgment for that of the courts; it is
something much broader, encompassing concepts beyond the
ken of the courts, and asking more of the governor than a review
of factual or legal guilt.
In closing, we point to an apt description of the traditional role of clemency in the criminal justice system from former Governor Winthrop Rockefeller of Arkansas:
Some would characterize executive clemency as little
more than grace, to be bestowed by a governor on the
basis of personal whim or caprice. This view is totally
wrong. In a civilized society such as ours, executive
clemency provides the state with a final deliberative
opportunity to reassess the moral and legal propriety
of the awful penalty which it intends to inflict. …
clemency far from being an extra legal device, is an
intimate and necessary part of a fair and impartial system of justice.116

1 The phrase “lethal absence of hope” is taken from an October
31, 2005 letter written by Father Gregory J. Boyle, S.J., the
founder of the largest gang rehabilitation program in the United
States, appealing to California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger to exercise his discretion as Governor and
grant clemency to Stanley Tookie Williams. A founder of the
Crips street gang who was convicted of four homicides, Stanley
Williams became a prominent anti-gang spokesman, author, and
Nobel Prize nominee during his twenty-five years on San
Quentin’s death row. Father Boyle’s letter spoke of Stanley
Williams as a man who had “transformed his gang past into a
beneficial presence” and become a symbol of hope and redemption to others. Father Boyle wrote: “Redemption is [the] only
hope in reconstructing lives . . . The hope of beginning anew is
the bright promise we offer. By exercising your power, you can
send the right signal of hope to those for whom hope is foreign…. Your decision to spare Stanley Williams’ life will touch
that lethal absence of hope in my community.” (emphasis
added). The authors of this article were pro bono clemency
counsel for Stanley Williams along with other dedicated attorneys. Governor Schwarzenegger declined to exercise his discretionary power to grant clemency, and Stanley Williams was
executed by the State of California on December 13, 2005. The
process followed by Governor Schwarzenegger in reviewing
Stanley Williams’ petition for clemency is discussed in Part 4 of
this article. The clemency petition for Stanley Williams is
available at www.savetookie.org and at www.cm-
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p.com/clemency.htm.
2 See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833) (“A pardon . . . exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from
the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.”).
3 While arising from the same power, commutation of a death
sentence is distinct from a pardon. As stated by Justice
Marshall in a dissenting opinion in Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S.
256, 273 n.8 (1974), “[a]lthough pardon and commutation
emanate from the same source, they represent clearly distinct
forms of clemency. Whereas commutation is a substitution of a
milder form of punishment pardon . . . relieves the recipient of
all the legal consequences of the conviction.”
4 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
MINIATURE
46,
163
(1817),
available
at
IN
http://books.google.com.
5 See Wilson, 32 U.S. at 160 (“The constitution gives to the
president, in general terms, ‘the power to grant reprieves and
pardons for offences against the United States’ as this power has
been exercised, from time immemorial, by the executive of that
nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial
institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon ...”).
6 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
7 For example, as Governor of Texas, George W. Bush, who
allowed 152 executions to proceed, was explicit in describing
the process he used to evaluate petitions for clemency. Asked
about the exercise of the clemency power, Bush stated simply:
“[M]y job is to ask two questions: Is the person guilty of the
crime? And did the person have full access to the courts of law?
And I can tell you, looking at you right now, in all cases those
answers were affirmative.” George Lardner, The Role of the
Press in the Clemency Process, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 179, 183
(2003) (quoting Governor George W. Bush (Texas), during the
2000 Presidential campaign debates, in Doug McGee, Bush –
Rush to Judgment, THE NATION, November 13, 2000). In his
autobiography, Bush added that to go beyond these two criteria
would be to impinge upon the authority of the jury: “I believe
decisions about the death penalty are primarily the responsibility of the judicial branch. . . . The executive branch is much
more limited. I view it as a failsafe, one last review to make
sure that there is no doubt the individual is guilty and that he or
she has had the due process granted by our Constitution and
laws and I don’t believe my role is to replace the verdict of the
jury.” See Elizabeth Rappaport, Retribution and Redemption in
the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1501, 1507-08 (2000) (quoting GEORGE W. BUSH & KAREN
HUGHES, A CHARGE TO KEEP 148 (1999)). Others have investigated, and we do not address here, the bona fides or accuracy of
the process Bush employed as Governor to answer the two
questions posed by his own analytical structure. See Alan
Berlow, The Texas Clemency Memos, THE ATLANTIC,
July/August 2003, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
doc/200307/berlow (“Yet a close examination of the written
execution summaries he prepared for Bush certainly raises
questions about the thoroughness of Gonzales’s approach – and,
ultimately, given the brevity of the summaries and the timing of
their arrival at the governors office, about the level of attention
Bush could possibly have devoted to the clemency process.”).
See also Sister Helen Prejean, Death in Texas, THE NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, January 13, 2005, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17670 (“When Berlow asked
Gonzales directly whether Bush ever read the clemency petitions, he replied that he did so ‘from time to time.’”).
8 In some states, including Texas, the clemency power of the
Governor is exercised at least somewhat in concert, to a greater
or lesser extent, with a state pardon board or similar authority.
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For purposes of this article, except where the clemency process
of a specific state is being discussed or it is otherwise of material significance, we direct our analysis to the usual circumstances -- that, whatever role may be played by a pardon board
or similar body, the sitting governor has the final and ultimate
clemency authority.
9 “The President … shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and
pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases
of Impeachment.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
10 Wilson, 32 U.S. at 160.
11 Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 281
(1998).
12 The history of clemency is discussed at length in Ex parte
Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 309-13 (1855) and Ex parte Garland, 71
U.S. 333, 341-52 (1866) and other sources cited herein. We
include here only that background necessary to provide context
for our discussion that the meaning of clemency has become
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Clemency Power in the Wake of the Clinton Presidency, 47
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the United States. The political and social value of the
Presidential pardon power took on perhaps its greatest importance in this country following the Civil War, when Presidents
Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, and Ulysses S. Grant repeatedly
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rejected by a clear majority of the Court. Id. at 273.
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72 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1507 (contrasting the mindset of governors today and in the 1960’s, and claiming that
today’s clemency decisions are more likely to respect the jury’s

Criminal Law Brief

decision, whereas forty years ago, governors believed that
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with an I.Q. of approximately 70. See Marshall Frady, Death in
Arkansas, NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105, 132.
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offices tended to be that the sentence ought not to be disturbed,
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3), of the 231 commutations granted for humanitarian reasons
since Furman and Gregg, (184 of which were granted by three
governors) there are very few strong examples where an individual was so changed by his years in prison that his rehabilitation was given as a reason for his clemency.
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